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This paper estimates the extent to which legal fees prevent liquidity-constrained households from declaring
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individual bankruptcy petitions, we document that the rebates caused an increase in the average liabilities
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Over the past three decades, consumer bankruptcy rates have tripled. As of the late 1990s,
nearly ten percent of American households had declared bankruptcy (Stavins, 2000). By
2001, over 1.3 percent of American households were ling for bankruptcy every year (Zywicki,
2005). In an attempt to slow the increase in bankruptcies, the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (bapcpa) raised the barriers consumers must
overcome in order to le for bankruptcy. The bapcpa requires that bankruptcy lers undergo
mandatory credit counseling at their own expense. Furthermore, the act raises the legal and
administrative fees that households have to pay in order to declare bankruptcy. These
\entrance fees" for bankruptcy increased from an average of $921 before the reform to an
average of $1,477 after the reform (GAO, 2008).
While there exists a divisive debate over these entrance fees (Zywicki, 2005; Mann and
Porter, 2010), little empirical research has estimated their eect. Unfortunately, economic
theory provides little guidance, as the welfare consequences of entrance fees are theoretically
ambiguous. On the one hand, fees may act as an ordeal mechanism, screening out households
who stand to gain little from ling for bankruptcy (Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982). On the
other hand, the fees may prevent liquidity-constrained households from ling for bankruptcy,
and those households may benet the most from ling.
In this paper, we nd that a signicant fraction of bankruptcy lers are liquidity-
constrained. We exploit plausibly exogenous variation in liquidity induced by the 2001
and 2008 income tax rebates. The rebates were distributed over 9{10 week periods in both
years, and households received between $300 and $1,200. The date households received their
rebates was eectively randomly assigned, which allows us to estimate the causal eect of a
one-time, anticipated increase in liquidity on consumer bankruptcy lings.
We nd that the tax rebates led to a signicant, short-run increase in consumer bankrupt-
1cies. Total bankruptcies increased by roughly 2 percent after the 2001 rebates, and by 7
percent after the 2008 rebates. The increase in bankruptcies was driven entirely by Chapter
7 lings, which is consistent with the existence of liquidity constraints.1 We nd no evidence
that the increase consisted of bankruptcies that otherwise would not have occurred. Instead,
the rebates likely allowed households to le months earlier than they otherwise would have
been able to le.
To interpret our results, we develop a simple model of consumer bankruptcy.2 The
model is motivated by the relevant case law regarding how bankruptcy courts treated the
tax rebates. It suggests that tax rebates should only aect the ling decisions of liquidity-
constrained households. The model allows us to translate our empirical results into an
estimate of the share of households who wish to le for bankruptcy but cannot aord to
do so. Combining our model and empirical results, we conclude that 2:0 percent of lers in
2001 and 3:8 percent of lers in 2008 could not aord to le for bankruptcy in the absence
of the tax rebates. The larger share in 2008 is likely driven by the larger average value of
the rebate checks as well as the more severe recession, which likely increased the number of
liquidity-constrained households.
Our results are consistent with existing evidence on household liquidity constraints (Lusardi
et al., 2011), and our paper contributes to the literature on the economic eects of these con-
straints. Liquidity constraints have been shown to cause excessive consumption responses
to transitory changes in income (Shapiro and Slemrod, 2003; Souleles, 1999; Hsieh, 2003;
Stephens, 2003), limit investment in human capital (Dynarski, 2003), and amplify the behav-
ioral response to unemployment insurance benets (Chetty, 2008).3 Additionally, liquidity
1Households can le for bankruptcy either under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. Chapter 7 lers are more
likely to be liquidity-constrained since they have lower incomes and fewer assets. Moreover, the majority
of Chapter 7 legal fees must be paid in advance of ling, while Chapter 13 legal fees can be paid gradually
after ling.
2See Wang and White (2000) for a related model.
3Liquidity constraints also aect sub-prime mortgage defaults in the months following lump-sum property
tax payments (Anderson and Dokko, 2011). By contrast, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) do not nd clear evidence
2constraints likely play an important role in the optimal design of social insurance programs
(Chetty, 2008; Hansen and _ Imrohoro glu, 1992). Since consumer bankruptcy functions|at
least in part|as a social insurance program, our paper is broadly related to the literature
on the role of ordeal mechanisms and entrance fees in the optimal design of social insurance
programs (Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982). We discuss below how our estimates shed light
on the welfare consequences of changing the structure of the consumer bankruptcy system.
Our paper is also part of a growing literature on the economic eects of tax rebates.
Most related papers focus on the eects of the tax rebates on consumption and expenditures
(Johnson et al., 2006; Agarwal et al., 2007; Shapiro and Slemrod, 2003; Bertrand and Morse,
2009), while other studies have estimated the eect of the tax rebates on mortality and
morbidity (Evans and Moore, 2011; Gross and Tobacman, 2011). To our knowledge, no
previous studies have focused on the eect of the tax rebates on take-up of social insurance
programs or consumer bankruptcy.
The tax rebates were designed to stimulate the economy. Our results therefore shed
light on how the rebates actually stimulated consumption. Previous studies have con-
cluded that households consumed a moderate-to-large share of the rebates (Johnson et al.,
2006; Parker et al., 2010). Our results suggest that many households used the rebates to
le for bankruptcy. Moreover, households may increase consumption by a great deal af-
ter bankruptcy (Filer and Fisher, 2005; Zhu, 2011). Thus our results suggest that|for
some households|the rebates may have increased short-run consumption by more than the
amount of the rebates themselves. In this sense, reducing the barriers to bankruptcy may
be a particularly eective economic stimulus, as the timely discharge of household debt may
increase household consumption substantially (Mian et al., 2011).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides background on
the tax rebates and describes the bankruptcy data that we have compiled. Section 3 outlines
that liquidity constraints restrict entry into entrepreneurship.
3a theoretical model that explains how the tax rebates can aect bankruptcy rates. Section 4
demonstrates how the rebates aected the number of bankruptcies. Section 5 describes how
the characteristics of the lers changed after the rebates. Section 6 discusses the alternative
explanations for our ndings and their policy implications. Section 7 concludes.
2 Background on the Bankruptcy Data and the Tax Rebates
In order to estimate the impact of the rebates on bankruptcy rates, we have compiled a
unique data set based on the Public Access to Court Electronic Records system.4 Our
sample consists of all consumer bankruptcy lings in the 72 courts that agreed to grant us
full electronic access to their dockets. Figure 1 presents a map of our sample coverage. We
veried that the data match aggregate counts of bankruptcies reported by the Administrative
Oce of the us courts.
Table 1 compares the characteristics of districts in our sample to those not in our sample.
The sample covers roughly 74 percent of bankruptcies in the United States and 73 percent of
the population. Coverage remains consistent across our sample period, which extends from
1998 to 2008. The districts in the sample have populations with slightly lower income, less
college education, and a lower unemployment rate.
The tax rebates were disbursed as part of the economic stimulus bills passed by Congress
in 2001 and 2008, and were specically designed to stimulate the economy during the on-
going recessions.5 The Internal Revenue Service (irs) sent the rebate checks on a schedule
determined by the head-of-household's social security number (ssn). Table 2 presents the
dates on which checks were sent. We include in our sample all bankruptcies that were led
at most 30 weeks prior to the date that checks were sent and at most 40 weeks after that
4We are grateful to Tom Chang for providing some of the computer code necessary to parse the electronic
records.
5The rebates were mandated by the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 and the
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008.
4date.6 In 2001, social security numbers were divided into ten equally-sized groups. Checks
were mailed from the 20th of July through the 21st of September. The payments ranged from
$300{$600.7 In 2008, households could elect to receive their stimulus payments via either
check or direct deposit. As indicated in the third panel of Table 2, there were only three
dates on which direct-deposit transfers were made. Roughly 40 percent of households elected
to receive their rebate checks via direct deposit (Parker et al., 2010). The rebate payments
were higher in 2008 than in 2001, ranging from $300{$600 for single lers to $600{$1200 for
couples.8
Figure 2 summarizes the bankruptcy rates by two-digit ssn group. Reassuringly, the
gure demonstrates that there is no systematic variation in bankruptcy rates across ssn
groups in the months leading up to the rebates.9
3 Conceptual Framework
This section presents a simple model that describes how an increase in liquidity can aect
bankruptcy rates. The model suggests that liquidity-constrained households are the only
households who change their ling behavior after the rebates. Such households can only le
after receiving the rebates. Thus bankruptcy rates increase after the rebates are distributed,
and the increase is driven by liquidity-constrained households.
6We restrict the sample by time relative to when the checks were sent, so that we have the same number
of observations for each group. The results are similar when we restrict by absolute, calendar time and are
also similar when we extend the sample window.
7Individual tax lers with no dependents could receive up to $300 through the rebate, single parents a
maximum of $500, and married couples jointly ling could receive $600. To receive the full amount, a single
taxpayer had to have earned at least $6,000 in taxable income in 2000 while a married couple jointly ling
had to have earned at least $12,000 in taxable income.
8If a ler's 2007 tax return indicated over $3,000 in qualifying income, the ler was eligible for at least the
minimum payment based on the following general guidelines: $300 to $600 for individuals, $600 to $1,200
for joint lers, and $300 for each qualifying child.
9An F-test fails to reject the hypothesis that the bankruptcy rates are equal across all groups with a
p-value of 0:726 in 2001 and 0:864 in 2008.
53.1 Model Assumptions
Consider the following three-period model. In period 0, households borrow an exogenous
amount of debt, B. We assume that debt is exogenous because of our empirical setting.
All households eventually receive the rebate within a short window of time, so neither the
amount nor maturity of their debt should depend on the timing of the rebates.
In period 1, households' wealth, W  f(w), is realized. In addition, households anticipate
receiving the rebate, with value I, in period 2. Households can decide to le in period 1, in
period 2, or not at all. Households consume all of their wealth net of debt and bankruptcy
costs at the end of period 2.10
Households le for bankruptcy when it is nancially benecial to do so, even if they have
the ability to repay their debts (Fay et al., 2002). Specically, households decide whether
and when to le by maximizing consumption in period 2 subject to liquidity constraints.
If a household declares bankruptcy, it pays a xed ling fee, c, and loses a share 1   e of
its wealth. The parameter e captures the generosity of the exemptions provided by the
bankruptcy court.11 A larger value of e means that a larger share of the household's wealth
is exempt and does not need to be turned over to the bankruptcy court during a bankruptcy
ling. Once the household has led for bankruptcy, it is absolved of its debts.12
A key assumption of the model involves how the bankruptcy court treats the lers' tax
rebates. We assume that the tax rebate is treated the same whether the household les
in period 1 or in period 2, and we further assume that the rebate is treated identically
10We assume no consumption takes place in period 1. Including consumption in period 1 would not
qualitatively change our results. It would, however, introduce another mechanism whereby some low-wealth
households that could technically aord to le would choose to le for bankruptcy in period 2 rather than
in period 1 due to the high marginal utility of consumption in period 1.
11In practice, exemptions are governed by both federal and state bankruptcy law. Exemption levels vary
widely by state and have been relatively stable at the state level since the early twentieth century (Mahoney,
2010; Gropp et al., 1997).
12Bankruptcy in this model is a composite of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy. While in practice
Chapter 13 lers repay their debts based on a three to ve year schedule, our framework can capture this
by setting the present value of repayments to 1   e times wealth net of legal fees.
6to the rest of the household's wealth. This assumption implies that households will not
strategically manipulate their ling date to try to shield their rebate from the courts. The
relevant case law strongly supports this assumption.13 If some households nonetheless choose
to le before receiving their rebates in an attempt to prevent them from becoming part of
the estate, then we would underestimate the percentage of constrained lers. We discuss this
possibility below. But given the assumptions above, consumption is equal to e(W +I  c)
if a household decides to le for bankruptcy and W + I   B otherwise.
3.2 Bankruptcy Filing Decisions
When deciding whether or not to le for bankruptcy, households face the following constraint.
The ling fee, c, must be paid in advance, so it must be the case that W > c if the household
declares bankruptcy in period 1 and W+I > c if the household declares bankruptcy in period
2. This assumption is particularly relevant for Chapter 7 lings. Court fees of approximately
$300 are paid in advance for both Chapter 7 and 13 lings. Legal fees for Chapter 7 are
almost always paid in advance, while those for Chapter 13 are often paid gradually, through
the ler's payment plan.
Household ling behavior depends on the level of realized wealth in period 1. We can
divide households into several groups. Some households have sucient wealth that they do
not le for bankruptcy at all. Such wealthy households are those for which
W + I   B  e  (W + I   c) ) W 
B   e  c   I  (1   e)
1   e
: (1)
Other households le for bankruptcy because it is nancially advantageous to do so. The
wealth of such households must satisfy two constraints. First, they are able to pay the ling
13Several court cases (in re Rivera, in re Lambert, in re Howell, and in re Alguires) have established that
for bankruptcies led after the passage of the two stimulus acts, the tax rebates become property of the
bankruptcy estate and are subject to normal rules governing other cash assets.
7fee in period 1 and in period 2, thus W > c. Second, it is in their economic interest to le
for bankruptcy. Such households then have wealth that satises:
c < W <
B   e  c   I  (1   e)
1   e
: (2)
These households are indierent between ling in period 1 versus ling in period 2. Consis-
tent with the characteristics of a typical bankruptcy, we assume that B is large relative to c
so that there exist households within this range of wealth. Because B is large relative to c
and the bankruptcy court treats the rebate as identical to other assets, a household that can
pay its debts by denition can also aord the ling fee. Therefore, there is no incentive for
an unconstrained household to manipulate its ling date. Any change in ling rates between
period 1 and period 2 will not be due to such households.
Finally, there exist households whose wealth is less than their debts but that do not have
enough wealth to le in period 1.14 Such liquidity-constrained households cannot borrow to
pay the ling fee in period 1, and so must wait until period 2 to le for bankruptcy. By
denition, then, such households have wealth that satises:
c   I < W < c: (3)
These households can only aord to le in period 2. Figure 3 shows how equations (1)
through (3) divide households into groups based on realized wealth.15
14A nal type of household is of little interest, given our empirical setting. Households with wealth
W < c I have so little wealth that they cannot aord the ling fee either in period 1 or in period 2. These
households will remain constrained and unable to le. They will be unaected by the rebates and we will
not observe them in the data.
15The value c   I is non-negative as long as the costs of ling are greater than the value of the rebates.
The value of the rebates were, at most, $600 in 2001 and $1,200 in 2008. In contrast, average bankruptcy
costs are estimated at $1,477 in 2007 (GAO, 2008).
83.3 Predictions of the Model
The model implies that only liquidity-constrained households change the date of their bank-
ruptcy based on the tax rebates. Such households can only aord to le after receiving their
rebate checks.
The model also yields a direct interpretation of our empirical estimates. Let X be the
share of households that are unconstrained and declare bankruptcy, and let Y be the share










Since unconstrained lers are indierent between ling in period 1 or in period 2, we as-
sume that half le in each period. The regressions below measure the percent change in
bankruptcies after the tax rebates are sent. In the simple case where all households receive
tax rebates, this empirical estimate  is the share of households ling in period 2 that are






By relaxing one of the model's key assumptions, we nd that our empirical results may
underestimate the true fraction of constrained households. Consistent with several legal
decisions, the model assumes that courts treat the rebate checks as a part of the bankruptcy
estate regardless of whether households le in period 1 or period 2. However, suppose that
some households are unaware of this and choose to le at period 1 in an eort to hide the
rebates from the court. In this case, the share of households that are unconstrained and le
at period 1 would be equal to X, where  > 1
2. In this case, the empirical estimates would
9equal:
 =







Our empirical results would therefore underestimate the fraction of lers who are constrained.
Thus, to the extent that households misperceive the laws regarding the treatment of rebates
under bankruptcy, our regressions will provide a lower bound for the share of bankruptcy
lers who are liquidity constrained.
Additionally, not all households received rebate checks. Assume that a fraction  of
households receive rebate checks. If we assume that households that received rebate checks






We can use equation (6) to translate our empirical estimates () into an estimate s =
Y=(X +Y ), the share of households who wish to le for bankruptcy but cannot aord to do






We use this expression to translate our regression estimates into estimates of s.
4 The Eect of the Tax Rebates on Bankruptcies
This section presents our main empirical results. We rst describe how the bankruptcy
rate changed after the tax rebates were distributed. We then describe how the rebate eect
evolved over time.
104.1 The Change in the Bankruptcy Rate After the Rebates
The way in which both the 2001 and 2008 tax rebates were distributed lends itself to a simple
dierence-in-dierence empirical framework. For the 2001 sample, we construct aggregate
counts of bankruptcies by two-digit ssn group (g) and week (w), and estimate the following
regression:
ygw =   IfAfter Check Sentggw + g + w + "gw: (8)
The outcome ygw is either the number of bankruptcies in group g and week w or its loga-
rithm, and g and w are group and week xed eects, respectively. The indicator function
IfAfter Check Sentggw is equal to unity starting one week after checks are sent for group
g, and zero otherwise. For the 2008 sample, we include an additional indicator function to
control for whether the ssn group has been given its direct deposit.
Panel A of Table 3 presents estimates of this regression for the 2001 rebates, while panel
B presents estimates for 2008. The rst two columns present results when the level and the
logarithm of Chapter 7 bankruptcies is the outcome of interest, respectively. Both columns
suggest a signicant increase in Chapter 7 lings after the rebates were distributed. In 2001,
each two-digit ssn group experienced an average of 5.6 additional bankruptcies per week.
The estimates in column two indicate a 3.8 percent increase in bankruptcies after the rebates.
Panel B demonstrates that this eect was larger in 2008. The bankruptcy rate increased
by 5.1 percent after the 2008 rebate checks were sent. But bankruptcies also increased by 6.2
percent after direct deposits were made. The total increase in bankruptcies after the 2008
tax rebates was thus 11.3 percent.
There are several possible explanations for the larger rebate eect in 2008. First, the
rebate checks were larger in 2008, and the larger rebate checks may have enabled more
liquidity-constrained households to le for bankruptcy. Second, the rebate checks were more
widely distributed: roughly 85 percent of households received rebate checks in 2008 versus
1157 percent in 2001 (Johnson et al., 2006; Parker et al., 2010). Third, the recession was
more severe in 2008, which could have resulted in more liquidity-constrained households.
All of these explanations would suggest a larger eect in 2008. Additionally, the bapcpa
dramatically changed the bankruptcy system in the intervening period (McIntyre et al.,
2010), raising attorney fees and encouraging households to choose Chapter 13 rather than
Chapter 7, though the expected eect of these legal changes on the 2008 results is less clear.
In contrast to the results for Chapter 7 lings, Table 3 suggests that the rebates had a
smaller impact on Chapter 13 bankruptcies. Columns 3 and 4 present point estimates for
Chapter 13 bankruptcies that are much smaller in magnitude than those for Chapter 7. The
estimates suggest a 2{5 percent decrease in Chapter 13 lings, decreases that are marginally
statistically signicant in 2001 but not in 2008. The small decrease in Chapter 13 lings
suggests that some households may have switched from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 after the
tax rebates. The increase in Chapter 7 lings, however, is much larger than the decrease in
Chapter 13 lings, thus the lers who switch represent a small share of bankruptcies aected
by the rebates.
This contrast between chapters is consistent with the existence of liquidity constraints.
There are two relevant dierences between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. First, Chapter 7
lers have lower incomes and fewer assets than Chapter 13 lers. Second, households who
le under Chapter 13 are charged higher legal fees, but are allowed to pay their attorneys
after ling.16 Chapter 7 lers, on the other hand, must usually pay their attorneys in
advance of ling. Both of these dierences suggest that Chapter 7 lers are more likely to
be liquidity constrained.17 And, indeed, Table 3 presents a much larger rebate eect for
16We constructed a random sample of 2001 and 2008 lings from the Central District of California. The
average total cost of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy was $1,100, while the average total cost of a Chapter 13
bankruptcy was $1,749. The average attorney fees paid before ling were $995 for Chapter 7 and $684 for
Chapter 13.
17An additional reason for the contrast by chapter is that a large share of Chapter 13 lers turn to
bankruptcy in order to halt a foreclosure (Mann and Porter, 2010). The timing of such bankruptcies is then
determined by the foreclosure process rather than by rebates.
12Chapter 7 bankruptcies.
Finally, columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 present estimates for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 lings
combined. The point estimates are positive and statistically signicant at conventional levels.
They suggest that consumer bankruptcy lings overall increased by 2.3 percent in 2001 and
by 6.8 percent in 2008. Using equation (7), we can convert the estimated rebate eects into
estimates of s, the share of bankruptcy lers who are constrained. The results suggest that
s = 2:0 percent in 2001 and s = 3:8 percent in 2008.18
The remainder of this section discusses a simple falsication test. Figure 4 presents the
results of this test. Each point represents estimates from specications identical to those
in column 2 of Table 3, but which are estimated for each year in our sample. We focus on
Chapter 7 lings since our main eect is most pronounced for Chapter 7, and rely on the log-
based specication in order to control for dierences in ling rates across years. Tax rebates
were not distributed by ssn group in years other than 2001 and 2008, but we construct
indicator variables as if they were. Specically, we construct placebo indicator variables
consistent with the 2001 rebate distribution for 1998 through 2004. For 2005 through 2008,
we construct placebo indicator variables consistent with the 2008 rebate distribution, and
plot the sum of the paper check and direct deposit placebo eects.19
The gure presents no evidence of a strong rebate eect in any years other than those
in which rebates were actually distributed. In all placebo tests, the condence intervals do
not exclude zero. A joint test of the hypothesis that all estimates except those for 2001 and
2008 are equal to zero fails to reject the null hypothesis with a p-value of 0.136. In contrast,
a joint test that the 2001 and 2008 estimates are jointly equal to zero leads to a p-value less
than 0.001.
18These estimates are based on assumptions that 57 percent of households received rebate checks in 2001,
and 85 percent received them in 2008 (Johnson et al. (2006), Parker et al. (2010)).
19Note that the condence intervals in Figure 4 are wider for estimates after 2004, because we plot the
sum of the paper check and direct deposit eects.
134.2 Variation in the Rebate Eect Over Time
This section describes how ling rates evolved over the weeks surrounding the rebates. To
measure such patterns, we estimate an event-study specication. We modify the regression
equation above to include indicator variables for 2-week intervals before and after the rebates.
The 2 weeks before each group received its rebate is the omitted category.
Figure 5 presents the estimates from that regression when the outcome is the logarithm of
Chapter 7 lings in 2001. The dotted lines plot 95-percent condence intervals and the solid
line plots the point estimates. The gure demonstrates that the bankruptcy rate increased
by roughly 4 percent in the month after the rebates were distributed, and the treatment
eect decreases monotonically after week 4.20 Figure 6 presents analogous estimates for
2008 which show a similar pattern.21
Figure 7 and Figure 8 present the same event-study estimates for Chapter 13 bankruptcies
in 2001 and 2008. Nearly all of the point estimates are statistically indistinguishable from
zero, though the gures suggest a slight decline in Chapter 13 bankruptcies following the
rebates, consistent with the results in Table 3.
As a whole, these gures suggest that the tax rebates led to an immediate, short-run
increase in Chapter 7 bankruptcies. The increase in bankruptcies lasted for roughly four
weeks after the rebates were distributed.
We interpret these results as providing evidence of the short-run, transitory eect of
20The results in Figure 5 suggest a modest, marginally signicant increase in ling rates 3 and 4 weeks
before the checks are sent in 2001. In contrast, Figure 6 suggests no discernable pre-trend in 2008. We cannot
identify a cause for the pre-trend in Figure 5; potentially, households may have led early, hoping to receive
their rebates after their bankruptcy case was discharged. We view this as unlikely, however, as bankruptcies
generally last for months, and judges were aware of the pending rebates. Nevertheless, it is possible that
some households misperceived the laws regarding how the rebates were treated by the bankruptcy courts.
21The regression underlying Figure 6 also includes an indicator variable for whether the ssn group had
received its direct deposit, so that these event study estimates report the dynamic eects of the rebates sent
through the mail. A similar event study graph using the direct deposit dates is extremely imprecise due
to the fact that there are only three direct deposite dates that are three weeks apart. This makes it very
dicult to estimate the dynamic eects of the rebates sent via direct deposit. By contrast, the paper dates
span roughly two months and are sent out at nine dierent dates.
14the rebates on consumer bankruptcies. We cannot identify households that did not receive
a rebate, as all ssn groups eventually received rebates; therefore, we cannot estimate the
long-run eects of the rebates. We strongly suspect, however, that the rebates had little
permanent eect on bankruptcy ling rates. Instead, our estimates likely represent a shift
in the timing of bankruptcies for households who were unable to le when they rst wished
to do so. We have two pieces of evidence in support of this interpretation. First, the
pattern of event-study coecients suggests the absence of a long-run eect; the estimated
coecients on the furthest lags are statistically and economically insignicant. Additionally,
Appendix Table A1 reports results of an alternative specication that attempts to estimate
the permanent eect of the rebates by comparing bankruptcy rates across months in dierent
years. The test assumes that the permanent eect of the rebates can be estimated by
comparing the total number of bankruptcies in the months during and after the rebates
with the same months in other years, controlling for (within-year) seasonality in bankruptcy
lings and controlling for long-run (across-year) trends in bankruptcy lings.22 Consistent
with the event-study gures, Appendix Table A1 also suggests no permanent eect of the
2001 tax rebates.23
4.3 Variation in the Rebate Eect by Local Characteristics
This section tests how local characteristics are associated with the rebate eects. We record
the zip code of residence for each bankruptcy ler in our database. We merge those zip codes
to median household income and home ownership rate, as measured in the 2000 decennial
census. This allows us to stratify our main specication by income. We also stratify lers by
22An important weakness of this strategy is that it assumes that the timing of the rebate programs
was exogenous. This is unlikely to be true; the rebate programs themselves were a political response to
macroeconomic conditions that likely aected overall bankruptcy lings. Nevertheless, we are reassured by
the similarity between the time-series results and the furthest lagged coecients in the baseline model which
suggest no permanent eects of the rebates.
23We only estimate the long-run eect of the 2001 tax rebate, because we have too little data after the
2008 rebates.
15a proxy for their access to credit. Following Mian and Su (2009), we merge each zip code
to the share of its residents in 1996 that were categorized as subprime borrowers.24 Due to
the rapid expansion of mortgage credit in subprime zip codes not matched by increases in
household income, subprime zip codes are a plausible proxy for liquidity constraints (Mian
and Su, 2009).
The theoretical model in Section 3 predicts that areas in which liquidity constraints
are more prevalent should be associated with larger rebate eects. Thus, if income, home
ownership, and sub-prime borrowing predict liquidity constraints, then these proxies should
be associated with larger rebate eects. Liquidity, however, is determined by the dierence
between a household's income and expenditures, not just income, assets, or subprime status.
Therefore, it is not clear a priori whether such proxies will have a discernible relationship
with the rebate eect.
Table 4 presents estimates of equation (8) for Chapter 7 bankruptcies when the sample
is stratied by terciles of these three variables. The rst three columns present results for
terciles of median income. The point estimates form dierent patterns in the two rebate
years. In 2001, the point estimates suggest a U-shaped pattern; the second tercile of income
is associated with the smallest rebate eect. In 2008, the rst tercile of income is associated
with the smallest total rebate eect. We emphasize, however, that none of these dierences
across the terciles is statistically signicant at conventional levels.
The second set of columns of Table 4 present results when the sample is stratied by the
likelihood of being a sub-prime borrower. The results also do not suggest a clear pattern. A
Wald test of equality of the three coecients in 2001 has a p-value of 0.11, and in 2008 the
associated p-value is 0.82. We cannot reject the hypothesis that households from all terciles
exhibited the same rebate eect. The last set of columns presents results when we stratify
24The variable captures the share of adults in the zip code whose fico credit score was 660 or lower in
1996 (Mian and Su, 2009). We are extremely grateful to Atif Mian and Amir Su for assistance in acquiring
these data.
16the sample by homeownership rate. Again, no clear pattern is present.
Overall, these results suggest a weak relationship between local characteristics and the
rebate eect. The pattern of point estimates by tercile suggests that the rebate eect is
not monotonically related to these proxies. Interestingly, Johnson et al. (2006) and Parker
et al. (2010) nd a non-monotonic eect for consumption. Both studies nd that both low-
and high-income households exhibit a higher sensitivity to tax rebates than middle-income
households. The 2001 results in Table 4 exhibit the same pattern. Such a pattern suggests a
complex relationship between liquidity and income, although we do not have enough precision
to reach strong conclusions on this point.
5 Analysis of Filers' Characteristics
While the results above demonstrate that Chapter 7 bankruptcy rates increased after the
tax rebates, a remaining question is which types of lers were responsible for that increase.
In this section, we describe how the average characteristics of bankruptcy lers changed
after the rebates. To do so, we collected legal documents for a random sample of consumer
bankruptcies in ten districts.25 We randomly selected 250 Chapter 7 lings from each district
in 2001 and 500 lings per district in 2008.26 For each ling, research assistants read the
associated legal documents and recorded the nancial characteristics of the household.
5.1 Sample Statistics
Households declaring bankruptcy must reveal many nancial and demographic details to
the court. Summary statistics for these details are presented in Table 5. The rst set of
25We selected the districts based on whether the court judge was willing to grant us a waiver to download
the les, and whether electronic records were available for both 2001 and 2008. The ten districts were:
the Central District of California, the Northern and Southern Districts of Iowa, the Western District of
Louisiana, the Southern District of New York, the Eastern and Western Districts of Oklahoma, the District
of South Carolina, the Eastern District of Texas, and the Northern District of West Virginia.
26Twice as many lings were used in 2008 because the signicant fraction of households receiving direct
deposits instead of checks decreases the precision of our estimates.
17rows describe the demographics of lers. These average characteristics changed relatively
little between 2001 and 2008. For instance, the percentage of primary lers who were female
increased from 24 percent to 25 percent between the two years. A t-test fails to reject that
the fraction of female lers remained constant (the associated p-value is 0.53). Filers were
single in 34{35 percent of cases, separated or divorced in 16{20 percent of cases, and married
in 46{49 percent of cases.27
The next set of rows in Table 5 describe the fees paid by lers. Fees generally increased
from 2001 to 2008, largely driven by the bapcpa. Filing fees are paid to the court at the
time of ling. The bapcpa standardized ling fees to $299 for all Chapter 7 cases starting
in 2005, increasing the average ling fee 50 percent from 2001 to 2008.28 Average legal fees
increased 70 percent from $746 in 2001 to $1,265 in 2008; that dierence across years is
statistically signicant at the 1-percent level.29
As shown in Table 5, the majority of legal fees are paid by the time of ling. Despite the
increase in fees, the percentage of fees paid increased from 79 percent in 2001 to 86 percent in
2008. Instead of paying for formal legal representation, lers can elect to represent themselves
in court and pay a smaller amount for legal advice and document preparation. The share of
lers representing themselves declined from 3.4 percent to 1.8 percent. This last comparison
suggests that the increased paperwork required by the bapcpa made it more dicult for
lers to forego formal legal representation.
The last set of numbers in Table 5 present statistics on the lers' nances. These statistics
suggest three general patterns. First, lers were signicantly wealthier in 2008 than in 2001.
Average annual income increased from $23,784 to $31,581, total assets increased from $70,923
27All lers were categorized into one of three marital-status categories according to the bankruptcy petition.
If no marital information was provided, we categorized the ler as single. A 2-test fails to reject that the
shares of lers in the marital status categories changed between 2001 and 2008, p-value 0.18.
28A small number of lers receive waivers for the ling fees or arrange to pay them on installment. We
nd that fewer than 1 percent fail to pay the full amount by the time of ling.
29These numbers are roughly consistent with ndings by the Government Accountability Oce that at-
torney fees increased from $712 in 2005 to $1,078 in 2007 (GAO, 2008).
18to $112,259, and total liabilities increase from $136,541 to $181,823.30 These patterns are
surprising since a main goal of the bapcpa was to discourage high-income households from
ling for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. At the same time, the average liabilities-to-income ratio
rose from 5.9 in 2001 to 6.6 in 2008, suggesting greater indebtedness. Consequently, it is not
clear from these simple comparisons whether lers were more or less liquidity constrained in
2008.
Another pattern is that lers' liabilities dwarf their assets and income. In both years,
the average ler bore liabilities roughly 6 times larger than their annual income and nearly
twice as large as total assets. Finally, it is important to note that these nancial variables
are heavily skewed. For instance, mean liabilities in 2001 were $135,649 while the median
was less than half as large: $61,989. As a result, we take the logarithm of these variables in
the regression analysis reported in Appendix Table A2.
5.2 Eect of the Rebates on the Characteristics of Bankruptcy Filers
This section presents evidence of the eect of rebates on the characteristics of households
ling for bankruptcy. Both our model and the estimates in section 4 suggest that the number
of liquidity-constrained lers increases in the weeks after the rebates. This should lead to a
change in the average characteristics of the lers.
We evaluate whether the rebates changed the characteristics of lers by presenting the
distribution of several nancial characteristics: (1) total liabilities, (2) debt-to-income ratio,
and (3) annual income. The distributions allow us to compare those who led before to those
who led after the rebates. We also report Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests of the equality
of these distributions. Additionally, Appendix Table A2 reports regression tables analogous
to the gures presented in this section.31
30These dierences across years are statistically signicant at the 1-percent level
31The results in Appendix Table A2 are qualitatively similar to the gures reported in the main text,
although the statistical precision is somewhat limited, especially when we include week xed eects.
19Figure 9 and Figure 10 present empirical cumulative distribution functions for the total
liabilities of lers in 2001 and 2008. In each gure, the solid line plots the distribution of total
liabilities for those who led after the rebates, while the dashed line plots the distribution
for the lers who led before the rebates. Both gures suggest that lers who led after the
rebates had higher total liabilities. In both gures, the associated K-S test rejects the null
hypothesis that the distributions are identical.
Figure 11 and Figure 12 present a similar pattern for the ratio of total liabilities to income
of each ler (debt-to-income ratio). The post-rebate lers have higher debt-to-income ratios.
By contrast, we do not nd consistent evidence that the distribution of income diers across
the two groups of lers (Figure 13 and Figure 14).
Overall, the results above suggest that households ling for bankruptcy after the rebates
are more likely to be liquidity constrained. Households ling after the rebates have larger
liabilities and a higher debt-to-income ratio than households ling before the rebates. In
contrast, they have roughly similar incomes.
6 Discussion
This section explores alternative explanations of our empirical results and discusses their
implications for policy.
6.1 Alternative Explanations
We consider two alternative explanations for our ndings. A rst alternative explanation is
that households timed their bankruptcy in order to keep their rebates from creditors or the
court. This explanation, however, is unlikely. All pre-ling income and assets are subject to
creditor action. Thus households trying to shield rebate income from creditors would have
20to le months before the rebates were sent.32 We nd no evidence for such an eect. Were
it to exist, this eect would bias our dierence-in-dierence estimates towards zero. Finally,
as described in footnote 13 above, bankruptcy judges were aware of the rebates and were
instructed to treat rebate income identically to other income.
A second alternative explanation is that households timed their bankruptcy so that they
could consume the rebates before ling. This second explanation is also unlikely. The average
\wild card" exemption under Chapter 7 is $7,073 (Mahoney, 2010). It is unlikely that the
rebates shifted a large share of households beyond that threshold. Moreover, if households
were to le for bankruptcy only after consuming their rebates, then we would observe a
decrease in bankruptcies before the rebates were distributed. The event study results above
do not suggest such a decrease. Finally, this alternative explanation cannot readily account
for the pattern across chapters or for the change in average liabilities before and after the
rebates, as demonstrated in section 5.
6.2 Policy Implications
Our empirical evidence suggests that legal fees force liquidity-constrained households to delay
ling for bankruptcy. It is not obvious, however, whether lower fees would raise welfare. The
eect of fees on social welfare depends on whether liquidity-constrained lers are those with
the largest or the smallest utility gain from bankruptcy. If liquidity-constrained lers have
the most to gain from bankruptcy, then entrance fees are likely to be socially inecient.
In this case, the bankruptcy system could otherwise rely on exemptions and the seizure
of assets to deter bankruptcies. Conversely, if liquidity-constrained lers gain less from
bankruptcy than other lers, then entrance fees may serve as an ecient mechanism to
deter such bankruptcies. In this way, liquidity constraints transform entrance fees into
32Bankruptcy cases are open for many months. The ler can choose the ling date, but cannot choose the
date when the case closes That date is determined by the resources of the court at the time of ling.
21ordeal mechanisms (Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982).
The theoretical model in Section 3 suggests that constrained households suer the great-
est utility loss from fees and enjoy the greatest utility gain from being able to le for
bankruptcy, thus supporting the argument made by Mann and Porter (2010) that a re-
duction in legal fees would be welfare enhancing.33 However, there are countervailing costs
that must also be considered. High fees may prevent two forms of moral hazard. First,
fees may inhibit households from borrowing excessively. Second, fees may deter bankruptcy,
holding borrowing constant. Both of these forms of moral hazard must be balanced against
the benets of reducing fees. To the extent that liquidity-constrained lers impose larger
moral hazard costs than the average ler, then ling fees may be eective in reducing moral
hazard costs overall. An important task in future work will be quantifying the moral hazard
costs associated with reducing entrance fees to bankruptcy.
7 Conclusion
We nd that tax rebates cause a signicant, short-run increase in consumer bankruptcies.
This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that legal fees force liquidity-constrained
households to delay ling. These results highlight the importance of liquidity constraints in
the optimal design of the consumer bankruptcy system.
An important area of future work is the consumption-smoothing benets of bankruptcy.
This is an important parameter in any comprehensive welfare analysis of the bankruptcy
system. Such research will shed light on the extent to which rebate-induced bankruptcies
provide eective economic stimulus. Our evidence suggests that tax rebates allow some
households to avoid a delay in ling for bankruptcy. If these households substantially increase
consumption following the discharge of their debts, then perhaps the timely discharge of
33Mann and Porter (2010) argue that congress can lower the amount of paperwork required for bankruptcy,
which in turn, would lower legal fees. They propose an expedited form of bankruptcy for low-asset lers.
22household debt is an important component of economic stimulus policies.
Another area of future work is further investigation into the determinants of bankruptcy.
A long-running debate centers over whether bankruptcies are primarily caused by unexpected
negative shocks (Himmelstein et al., 2009; Fay et al., 2002). More recent work has emphasized
the importance of myopic behavior (Hankins et al., 2011; Zhu, 2011). By contrast, our results
suggest than an important (and overlooked) determinant of bankruptcy may be the ability
of households simply to aord the fees.
Lastly, the concept that liquidity constraints aect the utilization (or take-up) of social
insurance likely extends beyond consumer bankruptcy. Previous work has found that liquid-
ity constraints are an important determinant of the behavioral response to unemployment
insurance (Chetty, 2008), and we suspect that the decision to utilize unemployment insurance
at all is also aected by liquidity constraints. Similarly, we suspect that the waiting periods
for disability insurance interact with liquidity constraints in determining utilization. Thus,
we believe a promising area for future research involves estimating the eect of liquidity
constraints on the take-up of a broad range of social insurance programs.
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This graph plots bankruptcies in March, April, and May of 2001 and in
January, February, and March of 2008. The distribution of the 2001 tax rebates
began in July, and the distribution of the 2008 tax rebates began in May. An
F-test fails to reject the hypothesis that weekly bankruptcy rates are 
equal across groups with p-value 0.726 in 2001 and 0.864 in 2008.
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Figure 3. Types of Households
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Note: Tax rebates were sent in 2001 and 2008.
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Weeks Since Rebate Receipt
The figure presents point estimates from a regression of log counts of bankruptcies on
indicators for two-week intervals. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals
that are robust to autocorrelation between observations from the same SSN group. The
sample consists of bankruptcies by SSN group and week, covering 30 weeks before and 40
weeks after groups were sent their tax rebate checks. SSN-group fixed effects and week
fixed effects not shown. The omitted time period is 1 and 2 weeks before rebate checks
were sent. 
Figure 5. Event Study Point Estimates, 2001
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Weeks Since Rebate Receipt
The figure presents point estimates from a regression of log counts of bankruptcies on
indicators for two-week intervals. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals
that are robust to autocorrelation between observations from the same SSN group. The
sample consists of bankruptcies by SSN group and week, covering 30 weeks before and 40
weeks after groups were sent their tax rebate checks. SSN-group fixed effects and week
fixed effects not shown. The omitted time period is 1 and 2 weeks before rebate checks
were sent. 
Figure 6. Event Study Point Estimates, 2008
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Weeks Since Rebate Receipt
The figure presents point estimates from a regression of log counts of bankruptcies on
indicators for two-week intervals. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals
that are robust to autocorrelation between observations from the same SSN group. The
sample consists of bankruptcies by SSN group and week, covering 30 weeks before and 40
weeks after groups were sent their tax rebate checks. SSN-group fixed effects and week
fixed effects not shown. The omitted time period is 1 and 2 weeks before rebate checks
were sent. 
Figure 7. Event Study Point Estimates, 2001
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Weeks Since Rebate Receipt
The figure presents point estimates from a regression of log counts of bankruptcies on
indicators for two-week intervals. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals
that are robust to autocorrelation between observations from the same SSN group. The
sample consists of bankruptcies by SSN group and week, covering 30 weeks before and 40
weeks after groups were sent their tax rebate checks. SSN-group fixed effects and week
fixed effects not shown. The omitted time period is 1 and 2 weeks before rebate checks
were sent. 
Figure 8. Event Study Point Estimates, 2008





























$200,000 $400,000 $600,000 $800,000
Total Liabilities of Filers
After Paper Checks Before Paper Checks
The figure presents the empirical cumulative distribution function 
based on a random sample of Chapter 7 bankruptcies in 2001. A
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the null hypothesis that the two
distributions are equal leads to a p-value of 0.001.





























$200,000 $400,000 $600,000 $800,000
Total Liabilities of Filers
After Paper Checks Before Paper Checks
The figure presents the empirical cumulative distribution function 
based on a random sample of Chapter 7 bankruptcies in 2008. A
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the null hypothesis that the two
distributions are equal leads to a p-value of 0.001.






























5 10 15 20
Liabilities-to-Income Ratio
After Paper Checks Before Paper Checks
The figure presents the empirical cumulative distribution function 
based on a random sample of Chapter 7 bankruptcies in 2001. A
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the null hypothesis that the two
distributions are equal leads to a p-value of 0.004.
Figure 11: Filers' Liabilities-to-Income Ratio






























5 10 15 20
Liabilities-to-Income Ratio
After Paper Checks Before Paper Checks
The figure presents the empirical cumulative distribution function 
based on a random sample of Chapter 7 bankruptcies in 2008. A
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the null hypothesis that the two
distributions are equal leads to a p-value of 0.015.
Figure 12: Filers' Liabilities-to-Income Ratio





























$30,000 $60,000 $90,000 $120,000
Income of Filers
After Paper Checks Before Paper Checks
The figure presents the empirical cumulative distribution function 
based on a random sample of Chapter 7 bankruptcies in 2001. A
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the null hypothesis that the two
distributions are equal leads to a p-value of 0.097.





























$30,000 $60,000 $90,000 $120,000
Income of Filers
After Paper Checks Before Paper Checks
The figure presents the empirical cumulative distribution function 
based on a random sample of Chapter 7 bankruptcies in 2008. A
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the null hypothesis that the two
distributions are equal leads to a p-value of 0.002.








 in our sample
Consumer bankruptcies 259,961 90,020 349,981 74%
   Chapter 7 186,229 58,484 244,713 76%
   Chapter 13 73,613 31,487 105,100 70%
Population 201,904,852 75,112,770 277,017,622 73%
Median Family Income 40,990 48,139 42,497
Unemployment Rate 4.70% 4.86% 4.75%
Percent College 23.9% 27.4% 25.5%
Median Housing Value 117,012 151,670 124,076
Consumer bankruptcies 272,182 90,559 362,741 75%
   Chapter 7 183,788 58,740 242,528 76%
   Chapter 13 88,208 31,706 119,914 74%
Total population 222,045,717 54,971,905 304,059,728 73%
Median Family Income 50,169 61,021 50,861
Unemployment Rate 5.69% 6.06% 5.79%
Percent College 27.0% 29.4% 27.7%
Median Housing Value 210,302 306,000 214,900
Note: This table describes the characteristics of the bankruptcy districts in our sample. See text for 
details.
B. 2008 Sample
Table 1: Sample Coverage 







00 – 09 July 20 00 – 09 May 16 00 – 20 May 2
10 – 19 July 27 10 – 18 May 23 21 – 75 May 9
20 – 29 August 3 19 – 25 May 30 76 – 99 May 16
30 – 39 August 10 26 – 38 June 6
40 – 49 August 17 39 – 51 June 13
50 – 59 August 24 52 – 63 June 20
60 – 69 August 31 64 – 75 June 27
70 – 79 September 7 76 – 87 July 4
80 – 89 September 14 88 – 99 July 11
90 – 99 September 21
Table 2. Dates When Rebate Checks Were Sent
Last 2 Digits 
of SSN's
Last 2 Digits 
of SSN's
Last 2 Digits 
of SSN's
Note: This table describes the dates on which the Internal Revenue Service sent tax rebate payments. The timing of 
when payments were sent was determined by the last two digits of the head-of-household's social security number.
35(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Levels Logs Levels Logs Levels Logs
After  5.640 0.038 - 1.160 - 0.024 4.480 0.023
Check  (1.024) (0.007) (0.564) (0.011) (1.116) (0.006)
Sent [0.000] [0.000] [0.042] [0.030] [0.000] [0.000]
R
2 0.776 0.787 0.473 0.473 0.771 0.791
After  5.445 0.051 - 0.471 - 0.011 4.974 0.033
Check  (0.948) (0.009) (0.535) (0.012) (1.039) (0.007)
Sent [0.000] [0.000] [0.380] [0.361] [0.000] [0.000]
After  6.388 0.062 - 1.538 - 0.037 4.850 0.035
Direct (1.695) (0.017) (0.889) (0.023) (1.817) (0.013)
Deposit [0.000] [0.000] [0.087] [0.105] [0.009] [0.009]
Total 11.834 0.113 - 2.009 - 0.048 9.824 0.068
Effect (1.973) (0.020) (1.092) (0.027) (2.161) (0.016)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.069] [0.079] [0.000] [0.000]
R
2 0.865 0.860 0.559 0.568 0.868 0.866
A. 2001 Tax Rebates
B. 2008 Tax Rebates
Note: N = 7,100. The sample consists of counts of bankruptcies by two-digit SSN group and week, 
covering 30 weeks before and 40 weeks after groups were sent their tax rebate checks.  The 
standard errors in parentheses are robust to autocorrelation between observations from the same 
SSN group. The associated p-values are in brackets.  SSN-group fixed effects and week fixed effects 
not shown.  
Table 3: The Effect of Rebate Checks on Bankruptcies
Dependent Variable: Level or logarithm of total bankruptcy filings 
per SSN group per week
Chapter 7 Chapter 13 All



















After  0.048 0.026 0.045 0.044 0.052 0.019 0.029 0.028 0.057
Check  (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Sent [0.000] [0.032] [0.003] [0.002] [0.000] [0.105] [0.015] [0.028] [0.000]
R
2 0.585 0.599 0.465 0.512 0.595 0.555 0.555 0.581 0.522
After  0.053 0.054 0.050 0.049 0.058 0.046 0.045 0.048 0.059
Check  (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.013)
Sent [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.000] [0.009] [0.020] [0.002] [0.000]
After  0.005 0.085 0.076 0.075 0.058 0.047 0.022 0.066 0.084
Direct (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.027)
Deposit [0.863] [0.006] [0.012] [0.016] [0.057] [0.176] [0.540] [0.049] [0.002]
Total 0.058 0.139 0.126 0.075 0.058 0.047 0.066 0.114 0.143
Effect (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.041) (0.038) (0.032)
[0.098] [0.000] [0.001] [0.016] [0.057] [0.176] [0.107] [0.004] [0.000]
R
2 0.616 0.702 0.658 0.648 0.702 0.632 0.613 0.669 0.669
Bankruptcies stratified by 
homeownership rate in zip code
A. 2001 Tax Rebates
B. 2008 Tax Rebates
Note: N = 7,100. The sample consists of counts of bankruptcies by two-digit SSN group and week, covering 30 weeks before and 40 
weeks after groups were sent their tax rebate checks.  The standard errors in parentheses are robust to autocorrelation between 
observations from the same SSN group. The associated p-values are in brackets. SSN group fixed effects and week fixed effects not 
shown.  
Table 4: The Effect of Rebate Checks by Local Characteristics
Dependent Variable: logarithm of chapter 7 bankruptcy filings per SSN group per week
Bankruptcies stratified by 
share of zip code residents who are 
sub-prime borrowers
Bankruptcies stratified by median 
family income in 
zip code
37Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Household Composition
   Female 24% 25%
   Single 35% 34%
   Separated or Divorced 16% 20%
   Married 49% 46%
   Number of children 1.04 1 1.20 0.92 0 1.20
Fees
   Filing fee $199 $200 $15 $299 $299 $0
   Legal fee promised $746 $700 $397 $1,265 $1,099 $654
   Legal fee % paid 79% 100% 30% 86% 100% 30%
   Self-representation 3.4% 1.8%
Financial Characteristics
   Annual income $23,784 $20,403 $24,656 $31,581 $26,738 $26,369
   Annual expenses $28,212 $23,712 $54,312 $35,868 $30,480 $28,668
   Total assets $70,923 $31,883 $310,346 $112,259 $55,074 $440,894
   Total liabilities $136,541 $62,896 $1,021,721 $181,823 $101,943 $392,214
   % of liabilities secured 42% 46% 30% 42% 44% 30%
   Liabilities-to-income ratio 5.9 3.05 34.5 6.6 3.7 20.5
 A. 2001  B. 2008
Note: This table presents statistics for a sample of chapter 7 bankruptcies from 10 bankruptcy districts. 
The sample consists of 2,132 bankruptcies in 2001 and 4,355 bankruptcies in 2008. See text for details on 
how the sample was constructed.
Table 5: Summary Statistics for Filings from Ten Districts
38(1) (2) (3) (4)
After 2001 0.000 - 0.004 - 0.017 0.006
Tax Rebates (0.039) (0.050) (0.050) (0.030)
[1.000] [0.937] [0.743] [0.844]
R
2
0.660 0.661 0.666 0.908
N 84 84 84 84
Cubic polynomial in time X
Quartic polynomial in time X
Quintic polynomial in time X X
Month fixed effects X
Note: This table reports results from a regression of log bankruptcies 
on a dummy for the period between June, 2001 and March, 2002 
(inclusive).  This captures two months before the 2001 tax rebate and 
six months afterwards.  The sample includes the months between 
January, 1998 and December, 2004 (inclusive), and the unit of 
observation is month-year.  The time polynomials are functions of the 
number of months since the start of the sample period, and are 
intended to capture long-run trends in bankruptcy filings.  
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses, and p-
values are in brackets.  
Appendix Table A1: The Long-Run Effect of the 2001 Rebates
Dependent Variable: Log of chapter 7 bankruptcies by month



















After 0.155 0.111 0.044 0.318 0.260 0.059
Check (0.045) (0.039) (0.028) (0.107) (0.084) (0.059)
Sent [0.001] [0.005] [0.119] [0.003] [0.002] [0.317]
R
2 0.105 0.084 0.100 0.126 0.108 0.127
After - 0.020 0.020 - 0.041 - 0.103 - 0.080 - 0.023
Check (0.053) (0.042) (0.030) (0.078) (0.066) (0.045)
Sent [0.702] [0.630] [0.175] [0.186] [0.228] [0.601]
After 0.107 0.025 0.082 0.151 0.059 0.092
Direct (0.054) (0.043) (0.031) (0.210) (0.149) (0.151)
Deposit [0.048] [0.566] [0.009] [0.472] [0.693] [0.541]
Total  0.086 0.045 0.041 0.048 - 0.021 0.069
Effect (0.032) (0.029) (0.021) (0.227) (0.167) (0.160)
[0.007] [0.126] [0.046] [0.832] [0.901] [0.667]
R
2 0.156 0.104 0.080 0.170 0.118 0.091
Fixed Effects
   SSN group FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
   Office FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
   Week FEs N N N Y Y Y
Appendix Table A2: The Effect of the Tax Rebates on Characteristics of the Filers
A. 2001 Tax Rebates
B. 2008 Tax Rebates
Note: The sample consists of Chapter 7 filings randomly selected from ten court districts: 2,132 
bankruptcies in 2001 and 4,355 bankruptcies in 2008. The standard errors in parentheses are robust to 
autocorrelation between observations from same SSN group, and associated p-values are in brackets. 
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